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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD and
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs and
Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 19,695
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES
CORPORATION and JEEP
CORPORATION. LARRY ANDERSON,
VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants and
Appellants.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Appellee (petitioner on rehearing) Stephen Whitehead will
be referred to herein as "plaintiff" or as "Whitehead."

The

claims of Deborah Whitehead were settled at trial, and she was
not a party to the appeal.

Appellants (respondents on rehear-

ing) American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation will
be referred to compositely as "AMC/Jeep" or "defendants."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
REHEARING CONTEMPLATES A PLENARY REVIEW OF
ALL ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL.
Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing on February 28,
1989.

AMC/Jeep

had

a full opportunity

to present

arguments against the granting of the petition.

all its

AMC/Jeep sought

and obtained all the extensions of time (two were granted) which
it felt necessary, and also sought and obtained leave to file an
oversize answer to the petition.

AMC/Jeep served its Answer to

Petition for Rehearing on April 4, 1989.
Court

entered

an

order

granting

On July 12, 1989, this

plaintiff's

Petition

for

Rehearing.
AMC/Jeep nevertheless devotes a substantial portion of its
Brief on Rehearing to challenge the propriety of this Court's
order granting rehearing, and further asserts that plaintiff's
claims are not within the scope of rehearing.

The arguments

which AMC/Jeep now raises are the same as in its Answer to
Petition for Rehearing.

AMC/Jeep's primary response to plain-

tiff's substantive claims is to quote from and refer to the
majority opinion in this case.
The grant of rehearing had the effect of withdrawing this
Court's initial opinion, and the matter should now be considered
by the Court has though no opinion had been rendered.

Karren v.

Bair, 63 Utah 344, 353, 225 P. 1094,,1097 (1924); 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Appeal and Error § 984 (1962).

2
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This Court's decision to grant rehearing is the law of the
case.
P.2d

Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761
42, 44-45

(Utah Ct. App.

1988).

It

is improper

for

AMC/Jeep to seek reconsideration of that decision, and it would
likewise be improper for this Court to do so.

Id.

An analogous

situation was presented to the court in Drury v. Lunceford, 18
Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966).

In accordance with the rules,

one party had sought a rehearing (a new trial), and the trial
court granted the motion.

The other party then sought re-

consideration of the grant of a new trial.

This Court held that

reconsideration was not permitted under the rules, and explained
that the restriction applied both to litigants and to the court:
This reflection brings one to realize what
an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a
judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a
state of uncertainty as to what the final
resolution of the matter should be.
When the precedure [sic]
authorizing a motion for a new trial has
been followed and, pursuant to proper
notice, the parties have made their representations to the court, and the court has
duly considered and made his decision upon
that motion, that completes both the duty
and the prerogative of the court. In order
to avoid such a state of indecision for both
the judge and the parties, practical
expediency demands that there be some
finality to the actions of the court; and he
should not be in the position of having the
further duty of acting as a court of review
upon his own ruling.
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
This Court should reject AMC/Jeep's belated and improper
request to reconsider the grant of rehearing.
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AMC/Jeep also condemns many of plaintiff's claims as being
either too similar or too dissimilar to the claims discussed in
the initial briefs.

Rehearing is not so limited.

Plaintiff acknowledges that numerous decisions state that a
rehearing is not for the purpose of rehashing the same arguments, nor is it proper to raise new issues on rehearing.

The

purpose of rehearing, nevertheless, is to insure that a correct
decision is made.

Rehearing is a last opportunity to correct

error, and is not discouraged.

Phelps Dodge Corp., Morenci

Branch v. Industrial Com'n, 90 Ariz. 379, 368 P.2d 450, 452
(1962).

Although the stated rules are properly invoked in ap-

propriate circumstances, the decisions also confirm that the
courts will consider the arguments necessary to insure that
justice is achieved.

E.g., Kentner v. Gulf Insurance Co., 298

Or. 69, 689 P.2d 955, 958 (1984); Shafer v. State Highway Com'n,
169 Kan. 264, 219 P.2d 448, 449 (1950).

This is particularly

true where

as a result

issues have become material

of the

initial opinion, or where the initial opinion has clarified the
specific issues the Court deems critical.

See Wilhorn Builders,

Inc. v. Cortaro Management Co., 82 Ariz. 48, 308 P.2d 251, 252
(1957) .
An example is Albrecht v. Uranium Services, 596 P.2d 1025
(Utah 1979), rev'd on rehearing, 607 P.2d 836 (Utah 1980).

The

case involved a review of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.

This Court initially upheld the trial court, holding

that there were no disputed issues of material fact.

4
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A dissent-

ing

opinion

by

Justice

Stewart

argued

presented a material factual dispute.

that

the

affidavits

596 P.2d at 1027.

The

defendant petitioned for a rehearing, rearguing the "same point
on rehearing as it asserted on appeal; to wit:

that genuine

issues of material facts have been raised . . . ." 607 P.2d at
836.

The second time around, this Court was persuaded by the

defendant, reversed its prior opinion, and adopted the prior
dissenting opinion as the opinion of the Court.

Id.

Plaintiff demonstrates below in connection with specific
claims that his arguments are clearly within the proper scope of
rehearing and justice dictates that the Court fully rehear this
matter.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PREVENTED EXTENSIVE CROSSEXAMINATION INTO COMPARISONS WITH OTHER VEHICLES
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A KEY ISSUE AND WOULD HAVE
MADE THE CASE UNMANAGEABLE AND CONFUSING.
AMC/Jeep asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in limiting AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiff's experts
concerning their knowledge of the rollover propensities of other
vehicles.
was

no

(Brief of Appellants on Rehearing, Point I.)

abuse

of

discretion,

however,

because

the

There

rollover

propensities of other vehicles was not a key element of plaintiffs

case, and even

if it was, any limitation

of cross-

examination was not prejudicial.
AMC/Jeep's
vehicles

attempt

to show that comparisons with other

is a key aspect of plaintiff's proof
5
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is logically

flawed.

AMC/Jeep argues that plaintiff was required to prove

that the Commando was defective, and because comparisons with
other vehicles could inferentially be construed as evidence of a
product defect, it follows that comparisons with other vehicles
was

a

critical

aspect

of

plaintiff's

proof.

The

proposition is correct, but the corollary is not.

initial

Although it

is true that proof of a defect was a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof, it does not follow that every component or subset
of "proof of a defect" was itself a critical aspect of plaintiff's

proof.

comparisons

Even

with

if

other

it

is assumed

vehicles

(as

that

opposed

plaintiff
to

made

defendants

interjecting that issue), such comparisons were not a critical
or key aspect of plaintiff's proof.
The critical and primary emphasis of plaintiff's proof on
the issue of product defect was that the Jeep Commando was not
able to safely perform reasonably foreseeable evasive maneuvers
at highway speeds.
dispute this.

(E.g., R. 2441-43.)

AMC/Jeep does not

Plaintiff used data generated from testing of

Jeep CJ-5s and CJ-7s to predict the rollover propensity of the
Commando, which has the same narrow track width and high center
of gravity, and therefore the same critical handling characteristics. (E.g., R. 2448, 2455.)

A CJ-5 film was introduced by

plaintiff to illustrate the data.
The trial court did not limit on the ground of relevance
AMC/Jeep's ability to respond by showing that other vehicles
with the same track width and center of gravity as the CJ-5 were

6
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stable.

That was not the thrust of AMC/Jeep's opposition.

The

primary aim of the excluded evidence and cross-examination was
to show that the Commando was not the only unstable vehicle on
the road.

Such evidence was irrelevant, and would have expanded

the length and complexity of the case beyond manageable proportions.
AMC/Jeep does not dispute that in determining whether the
trial court abused its discretion in identifying the key issues,
this Court should apply a multi-level

analysis.

The Court

should first determine what the trial court identified as the
key elements of plaintiff's proof, and then determine if there
is support in the record for the trial court's identification.
Second, and only if the cross-examination concerns a key issue,
this Court should then consider whether any limitation of crossexamination prevented the defendants from adequately challenging
plaintiff's evidence. (Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 9.)
AMC/Jeep does not refer to any evidence which would show
that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that
comparisons with other vehicles was not a primary aspect of
plaintiff's proof

on the

critical

issue

of product

defect.

There is evidence in the record which supports the trial court's
determination, and it must therefore be affirmed.

7
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POINT III
THE FILMS OFFERED BY DEFENDANTS ARE NOT
PART OF THE RECORD IN THIS CASE
AND CANNOT BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT.
One of AMC/Jeep's primary contentions on appeal was that
the trial court erred in excluding certain exhibits offered by
AMC/Jeep,

including two films and a story board.

Plaintiff

demonstrated in his Brief on Rehearing that the majority opinion
erred in addressing the admissibility of those exhibits, because
the exhibits were not before the Court for consideration or
review.

AMC/Jeep

responds

by

characterizing

argument as "hypertechnical" and erroneous.1

plaintiff's

(Brief of Appel-

lants on Rehearing at page 32.)
Plaintiff's
erroneous.

arguments

are

neither

hypertechnical

nor

AMC/Jeep makes a vigorous attempt to demonstrate

that the excluded exhibits were somehow designated as part of
the record, but wholly misses the point.

Regardless of whether

the exhibits were designated as part of the record (plaintiff's
initial Brief on Rehearing establishes that the exhibits were
not

so

designated),

the

inescapable

fact

remains

that

the

exhibits were not part of the physical record transmitted to
this Court for review.

The exhibits furthermore are not in the

possession of the trial court clerk.

AMC/Jeep apparently took

the exhibits home with them after they were excluded by the
trial court.

The exhibits were not, and could not have been,

1

AMC/Jeep's venomous criticisms of Whitehead's argument and
of the manner in which it was presented are unprofessional and
inaccurate. See Point VII below in this Reply Brief.
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part of the record on appeal in this case, because AMC/Jeep
retained the exhibits and did not take the proper steps to
proffer them for purposes of appellate review.
AMC/Jeep had the burden to preserve a record that would
enable appellate review of its claims of error.
Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985).

State v.

In the case of excluded

exhibits, the proper procedure is to proffer the exhibits so
that they may be retained in the record although not admitted
into evidence.

AMC/Jeep did not fulfill its duty to preserve

the evidence in the record.

Plaintiff raised this issue in its

initial brief.2
Where there is nothing before this Court to demonstrate
otherwise, this Court should presume that there is something in
the evidence to justify the trial court's decision.

Mascaro v.

Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 943 (Utah 1987); James Manufacturing Co. v.
Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 129 (1964).
is not hypertechnical.

This argument

Many years have passed since the trial

2

AMC/Jeep claims that this issue was raised for the first
time on rehearing. That is not correct. Plaintiff's initial
Brief on Appeal argued, with supporting citations, that the
films had not been admitted in evidence and that their persuasive effect could not be demonstrated or argued.
(Brief of
Respondents Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead, dated
August 2, 1984, at p. 45.)
AMC/Jeep apparently now asserts that there is a distinction
between arguing that the admissibility of an exhibit cannot be
reviewed because the exhibit was not admitted into evidence, and
arguing that the admissibility of the exhibit cannot be reviewed
because it was not part of the record (which in turn was because
it was not admitted into evidence). If there is a distinction,
it makes no substantive difference.

9
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\

of this case, and counsel for plaintiff cannot now remember all
the reasons why the exhibits were inadmissible.

Some of the

reasons are apparent from the record, but counsel believes that
there were other reasons, inherent in the exhibits, which were
not

articulated

by

the

trial

court

but which

independent basis for excluding the exhibits.

would

be

an

The decision of

the trial court should be affirmed if there is any proper basis
for doing so, even if that basis was not articulated by the
trial court.

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895

(Utah 1988).
Plaintiffs

counsel

wanted

to

examine

the

exhibits

in

connection with this rehearing to refresh his recollection as to
all

the

reasons

why

the

exhibits

were

excluded.

Despite

diligent effort, counsel could not locate the exhibits.
exhibits are not physically part of the record.
physically

impossible

for

this

Court

to

The

It likewise was

have

examined

the

exhibits.
AMC/Jeep failed to preserve the excluded evidence in the
record.
brief.

Plaintiff properly raised the failure in its initial
AMC/Jeep's failure precludes appellate review.
POINT IV

AMC/JEEP'S FAILURE TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH RESPONSE
TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT'S
EXCLUSION OF AMC/JEEP'S EXHIBITS.
AMC/Jeep c l a i m s
of Jeep CJ-5s,
les,

error

in the exclusion

of

a Heitzman

a Heitzman f i l m on r o l l o v e r s

of

non-Jeep

and a " s t o r y b o a r d "

(Exhibit 130).
10
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film

vehiccourts

reasons for excluding these exhibits was AMC/Jeepfs failure to
produce them in response to discovery requests.3

The discovery

requests included (1) an initial group which sought disclosure
of

tests

relating

to

the

handling

characteristics

of

the

Commando, (2) plaintiff's fourth set of interrogatories, which
sought disclosure of materials provided to AMC/Jeep's expert
witnesses, and (3) a set, submitted by defendant Larry Anderson,
which sought identification of all exhibits. (Petitioner's Brief
on Rehearing at 24-25.)
AMC/Jeep's response to plaintiff's discovery abuse arguments

is

that

the

arguments

regarding

the

first

group

of

requests are precluded from review because they are too similar
to arguments

raised

previously,

and the arguments

regarding

plaintiff's fourth set of interrogatories are precluded because
they

are

too

dissimilar

to

arguments

raised

previously.

AMC/Jeep also claims that it was not required to disclose all of
the requested information about its experts.

AMC/Jeep does not

defend its failure to answer the Larry Anderson interrogatories.
Point I of this Reply Brief establishes that the claims of
discovery abuse are well within the proper scope of a rehearing.
One of AMC/Jeep's criticisms of plaintiffs' argument is that it
called the Court's attention to AMC/Jeep's failures to answer
plaintiffs' fourth set of interrogatories (seeking information
3

The Heitzman film on non-Jeep rollovers and the storyboard
were also inadmissible because they were irrelevant (Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 37-40). Appellate review of all the
exhibits is precluded by AMC/Jeep's failure to make them part of
the record. (Point III above.)
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regarding material reviewed by AMC/Jeep's experts) and defendant
Larry Anderson's interrogatories to AMC/Jeep

(which requested

the names of AMC/Jeepfs experts and a list of all exhibits which
would be offered).
specific

While AMC/Jeep's failure to answer these

interrogatories

was

not

discussed

in

plaintiffs'

initial brief in this case, AMC/Jeep's failure to respond to
discovery was extensively discussed.
AMC/Jeep
AMC/Jeep's

acknowledged

at

exhibits had been

trial

that

requested.

disclosure

of

In discussing

the

Heitzman films, Mr. Mandlebaum, AMC/Jeep's attorney, stated that
"[i]t wasn't requested until interrogatories, your Honor."
3343.)

Notwithstanding

AMC/Jeep's

acknowledgment

that

(R.
dis-

closure of the exhibit had been requested in interrogatories,
AMC/Jeep

then

proceeded

to

try

to

justify

its

failure

to

disclose the films by arguing that the films were immune from
discovery either because they were work product, or because they
had been created by Jeep's attorneys rather than by Jeep itself.
These claims were wholly unfounded and improper.

(Petitioner's

Brief on Rehearing at 37.)
AMC/Jeep had been very crafty and stingy in its disclosure
of requested information to plaintiffs.
was

disclosed

came

only

acquired.

The exhibits

within

scope

the

AMC/Jeep.
the

of

after

the

The information which

Court's

assistance

in question were at least

plaintiffs'

initial

was

arguably

interrogatories

to

Plaintiff had sought discovery of tests relating to

handling

characteristics

of

12

the

Commando,
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and

AMC/Jeep

attempted to introduce the exhibits to demonstrate those very
handling characteristics.

Even though AMC/Jeep has disputed the

scope of the initial interrogatories, plaintiffs' fourth set of
interrogatories and defendant Larry Anderson's interrogatories
to AMC/Jeep unquestionably sought disclosure of the films.

The

decision of the trial court to exclude the films was based not
just on the rulings of the prior trial judge, but on the entire
history of AMC/Jeep's recalcitrance in discovery.

Plaintiff

properly, on rehearing, called this Court's attention to all
aspects of that discovery, even though some of the individual
interrogatories were not discussed in the initial briefs.
AMC/Jeep does not dispute, and thereby implicitly admits,
that the excluded exhibits were within the scope of plaintiffs'
fourth set of interrogatories and defendant Larry Anderson's
interrogatories.

AMC/Jeep's only response is apparently that

the exhibits were not a proper subject of discovery because they
would come in through an expert witness.

The expert discovery

rules in effect at that time allowed only limited discovery
concerning expert witnesses.
AMC/Jeep's argument illustrates the approach it took to all
of plaintiff's discovery requests.

AMC/Jeep ignored the mandate

that the rules (and also the interrogatories) are to be construed by both court and counsel "to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."
1.

Utah R. Civ. P.

"[U]ndue rigidities or technicalities" are to be eliminated.

Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967).
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Former Rule 26(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
did limit the circumstances under which a party could discover
the facts known or opinions held by an expert witness.

The Rule

did not shield from disclosure, however, materials which had
been

provided

to

admitted at trial.

the

expert,

nor

exhibits

which

would

be

The subject exhibits were not protected

under former Rule 26(b)(4), and AMC/Jeep clearly should have
disclosed the films in response to the various interrogatories
discussed above.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
ON COMPARISONS WITH OTHER VEHICLES AND
ON SEAT BELTS.
In Point IV of its brief, AMC/Jeep argues in support of the
majority

opinion's

accumulation

of

nonprejudicial

errors.

Plaintiff has adequately addressed that issue in his initial
brief on rehearing, and will not reargue that issue here.

In

the course of presenting its arguments, however, AMC/Jeep makes
several

assertions

that

are

incorrect

and

which

demand

a

response•
First, on page 45 of its brief, AMC/Jeep states that the
trial court permitted the plaintiffs to present:
a theory of liability that the accident
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and
unreasonably dangerous because:
(a) it was purportedly
"substantially similar" to the CJ5;
and
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(b) the
CJ5 was
purportedly
defective because certain tests
purportedly showed that the CJ5
was more likely to rollover than
other
vehicles,
including
passenger cars[.]
Brief of Appellants on Rehearing at pages 45-46.
AMC/Jeep

has

employed

the

tactic

of

mischaracterizing

plaintiffs' argument, and then arguing against the mischaracterized version.
trial court.

AMC/Jeep made the same type of argument to the

The trial court, whose right it is to make such

determinations, properly held that AMC/Jeep's characterization
of plaintifffs theory of liability was not the correct one.

See

Point II of this Reply Brief.
The issue on appeal is thus not whether the trial judge
allowed plaintiff to make comparisons with other vehicles, and
then unfairly prohibited defendants from doing so, but rather
whether the trial court abused its discretion in identifying and
characterizing plaintiff's theory of liability.

In making that

determination, this Court should follow the standard rule and
affirm the trial court's decision if there is a reasonable basis
in the record to support it.
Such a reasonable basis exists in this case.
exception

of the use

of the

CJ-5

film

to

With the

demonstrate

the

handling characteristics of a vehicle with the same track width
and center of gravity as the Jeep Commando, there were only
three or four isolated references to other vehicles made during
the course of plaintiffs' evidence.

Those "comparisons" with

other vehicles were either elicited by the defense or elicited
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by the plaintiff

in response to the defendants1

challenges.

(Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 10-14.)
Even if one assumes that there is evidence in the record
which would have supported the trial court in characterizing the
plaintiffs1 theory of liability as AMC/Jeep has characterized
it, the existence of such evidence is legally irrelevant to the
issue on appeal.
abused

its

liability.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court

discretion

in

identifying

plaintiffs1

theory

of

There is competent evidence in the record which

supports the trial court's decision, and it should be affirmed.
AMC/Jeep also contends, on page 47 of its brief, that "the
Court properly held that evidence of how the presence of seat
belts affected the design safety of the vehicle was erroneously
excluded under the circumstances of this case."
AMC/Jeep.]
holding

[Emphasis by

Plaintiff respectfully submits that this was not the

of

this

Court.

The

majority

opinion

states,

pertinent part, as follows:
We agree that evidence of how the
presence of seat belts affected the design
safety of the vehicle should be admitted.
However, the bulk of defendants' proffered
evidence and the main thrust of their
argument regarding seat belts was directed
at plaintiffs failure to use them as
constituting
contributory
negligence
or
failure to mitigate damages.
. . .
We
therefore find that the trial court did not
err in excluding evidence that the failure
to use seat belts constituted contributory
negligence or failure to mitigate damages.
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.
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in

This Court did not hold that the trial court erroneously
excluded any evidence concerning seat belts.

The holding was

that if defendants had offered evidence of how the presence of a
seat belt affected the design safety, such evidence would have
been

admissible.

defendants

did

This
not

Court

present

properly

any

such

held,

however,

evidence.

that

Even

if

defendants had presented such evidence, the additional question
would be presented of whether the trial court had abused its
discretion in excluding the evidence, and whether the exclusion
was harmful.

Neither of those questions was addressed by the

Court, and it is, therefore, inaccurate to state that this Court
held that any seat belt evidence was "erroneously" excluded.
In addition, this Court's holding on the admissibility of
seat belt evidence can only be construed as a holding that an
individual has no legal duty to wear a seat belt, even if one is
available.

Accord Swaaian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d

1041 (R.I. 1989).

Many and perhaps most people do not wear seat

belts, and the failure to wear seat belts is certainly foreseeable.

In the light of that factual background, it defies logic

to hold that the mere availability of a safety belt, which a
person has no duty to use and which he foreseeably will not use,
is admissible or persuasive evidence of a safe design.
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POINT VI
ANY RETRIAL SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE
ISSUE OF LIABILITY ONLY.
In response to plaintiffs1

request that any retrial be

limited to liability only, AMC/Jeep has cited

several cases

where the courts held that the issue of damages and liability
were so intermingled in those cases so as to require the retrial
be on all issues.

AMC/Jeep does not refer to any evidence in

the record to challenge plaintiffs1 assertion that the issues of
liability
actually

and

damages

separated

in this

at trial.

case

are

This Court

separable
should

and were

affirm the

jury's findings on damages.
As an alternative, if this Court is not inclined to rule as
a matter of law that AMC/Jeep

is not entitled

to a second

opportunity to challenge the amount of plaintiff's damages, this
Court should clearly state that the trial court has discretion
to make such a determination in this case.
POINT VII
AMC/JEEP'S UNJUSTIFIED CRITICISMS OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND OTHER
CAPTIOUS COMMENTARY IS UNPROFESSIONAL.
The briefs submitted by AMC/Jeep
corous.

in this case are ran-

Plaintiff made a motion to strike AMC/Jeep's opening

Brief of Appellants because of its unjustified and harsh claim
that the trial court was prejudiced.

AMC/Jeep continues the

same style of acrimony in its Brief of Appellants on Rehearing.
AMC/Jeep!s brief speaks for itself in this regard.
18
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Further,

AMC/Jeep is captious in its presentation of facts and arguments.
A few examples will be sufficient.
AMC/Jeep!s 17-page statement of facts is primarily argument, and does not state the facts in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict as is required on appeal.
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

Scharf v. BMG

On page 17 of its brief, for

example, AMC/Jeep complains about a film which showed anthropomorphic "dummies.11

AMC/Jeep does not explain that the portions

of the film emphasizing the dummies was not shown to the jury,
and the jury was instructed that the film did not represent the
movement of the occupant in the Whitehead accident. (R. 2983.)
In footnote 5 on page 33 of its Brief, AMC/Jeep implies
that plaintiff quoted an argument from its initial brief out of
context.

The accusation is incorrect.

(See footnote 2 of this

Reply Brief.)
In footnote 4 on page 33 of its Brief, AMC/Jeep claims that
plaintiff improperly omitted a period from a quotation.

Even if

the omission were in error, it would not warrant criticism.

The

omission was, however, in accordance with generally accepted
rules of style.

Columbia Law Review, et al., A Uniform System

of Citation para. 5.3 at p. 27 (14th ed. 1986); University of
Chicago, The Chicago Manual of Style para. 10.47 at p. 295 (13th
ed. 1982).
AMC/Jeep,
every

in contrast, has added bold-facing

quotation

in

its

brief

without

indicating
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to nearly
that

the

emphasis is added. A Uniform System of Citation, supra, at para
5.2.
It is not plaintiff's intent to debate whether strident
arguments
stepped

are

appropriate.

over the

unjustified

line

attacks

AMC/Jeep

has, by

of permissible

on

the

trial

any

argument.

court

and

on

standard,
AMC/Jeep's

plaintiff's

counsel are not appropriate, and should not be rewarded by this
Court.
CONCLUSION
Each of plaintiff's arguments are within the proper scope
of rehear Iffg.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion>
received a fair trial.

and all parties

The judgment and verdict of the trial

court should be affirmed.
DATED this

2

-°i>

day of November, 1989.
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JACKSON ftOWARD and
7}
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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